(A NewsLeader Editorial, Friday, October 9, 2026)
The consistency is becoming profoundly worrisome, that Nigeria's borrowing addiction has become one of the most serious threats to the country's economic future.
For years, successive governments have borrowed to finance budget deficits, infrastructure, economic emergencies and, increasingly, government obligations that ought ordinarily to have been financed from internally generated revenue. The result is a country that is borrowing more while millions of its citizens continue to ask a painfully simple question: where are the roads, electricity, jobs, industries, hospitals, schools and other productive assets that should justify this mountain of debt?
This frightening development is becoming a serious national emergency today, such that the nation's monetary experts, development economists and the worried citizens are begining to ask relevant questions, insisting that the President Bola Ahmed Tinubu administration must learn to borrow less, account for every naira so far externally and locally borrowed, and make every new loan produce measurable national assets.
The Nigeria's Debt Management Office (DMO) puts Nigeria's total public debt currently at ₦166.79 trillion as at June 30, 2026. This stock comprises ₦91.59 trillion domestic debt and ₦75.20 trillion external debt. The Federal Government alone accounts for about ₦152.77 trillion of the total.
That figure should, infact, alarm every Nigerian, not necessarily because borrowing itself is evil, or the Tinubu government shouldn't have borrowed at all, but because borrowing without commensurate productive investment is simply mortgaging the future of Nigeria to finance the present.
It is even germane at this point to ask how did we get here? Now, when the former President Muhammadu Buhari administration came on board on May 29, 2015, Nigeria's public debt was approximately ₦12.6 trillion. By June 2023, when the Buhari handed over to the Tinubu government, the total public debt had risen to ₦87.38 trillion. The DMO subsequently confirmed that the June 30, 2023 figure was ₦87.38 trillion and that it covered the Federal Government, 36 states of the Federation and the FCT Abuja.
In other words, Nigeria's public debt stock increased by roughly ₦74.8 trillion during the eight-year Buhari regime's period, although it would be wrong to describe the entire increase as money newly borrowed by Buhari. Exchange-rate movements, disbursements on previously contracted loans and the recognition of existing liabilities also affected the naira value of the debt.
Nevertheless, the scale of borrowing under Buhari cannot be dismissed. Nigeria experienced recession in 2016, then another major economic shock during COVID-19, declining oil revenues, insecurity and serious revenue shortfalls. The Buhari government consequently relied heavily on borrowing to finance its budget deficits.
The DMO explained in 2023 that Nigeria's persistent debt problem arose principally from years of budget deficits funded substantially through borrowing. It noted that deficits had grown from ₦1.62 trillion in 2015 to ₦10.78 trillion in 2023 and that between 82 and 99 per cent of the deficits were financed through new borrowing. The Buhari administration therefore had genuine economic reasons to borrow. The COVID-19 pandemic, recession, infrastructure deficit and security crisis were not imaginary problems.
But the fundamental question remains: did Nigeria get sufficient economic returns from the borrowing? From evident indications,
there were visible projects. Roads were constructed and rehabilitated; railway projects were developed; power and agricultural programmes received funding; and some multilateral loans supported health, education and social programmes.
Yet much of the borrowing also went into financing general budget deficits. The Buhari administration's 2021 budget, for example, projected a deficit of ₦5.20 trillion, to be financed principally by ₦4.28 trillion in new borrowing, together with privatisation proceeds and drawdowns on multilateral and bilateral loans.
His 2023 budget projected a staggering ₦10.78 trillion deficit, with ₦6.31 trillion budgeted for debt service. This was the beginning of the dangerous cycle of borrowing, spending, debt servicing, further borrowing to finance the deficit and then another borrowing to refinance maturing obligations.
No doubt, President Tinubu's administration inherited a highly indebted government, a huge debt problem, but the debt problem now appears to have become bigger. However, three years later, the numbers have become much larger. Nigeria's total public debt stood at ₦97.34 trillion at the end of 2023. It rose to ₦144.67 trillion by December 2024, and eventually reached ₦159.28 trillion by December 2025. Presently, it stood at ₦166.79 trillion as at June 2026. The increase from June 2023 to June 2026 is approximately ₦79.4 trillion, or about 91 per cent.
From the exterior, the Tinubu administration may have a legitimate defence to the debt saga. His Finance Minister, Mr Taiwo Oyedele, explained in July 2026 that it would be incorrect to interpret the entire increase as fresh borrowing. According to the minister, more than ₦40 trillion of the increase resulted from the naira value of existing foreign-currency debt being revalued following the sharp depreciation of the naira, while about ₦33 trillion represented the securitisation of inherited Ways and Means advances—an existing obligation rather than entirely new borrowing.
This explanation might seem important.
Nigeria has not borrowed ₦79 trillion of fresh money simply because its debt stock increased by ₦79 trillion. But neither should government use exchange-rate revaluation as a blanket explanation for every increase.
There has undeniably been substantial fresh borrowing under Tinubu. But is important to actually ascertain what the government has borrowed.
There is unfortunately no single publicly presented government table that gives Nigerians, in one place, the cumulative amount of fresh Federal Government borrowing from May 29, 2023 to this present October 2026, separated neatly into domestic borrowing, external borrowing, refinancing, new loans and actual cash disbursements. That is itself a transparency problem.
Among the major identifiable external financing transactions and requests under Tinubu are the $2.25 billion World Bank financing package approved in 2024, comprising $1.5 billion in development policy financing and $750 million under a programme-for-results arrangement. Nigeria also raised $2.2 billion in Eurobonds in December 2024, comprising a 6.5-year bond maturing in 2031 and a 10-year bond maturing in 2034. Their coupons were 9.625 per cent and 10.375 per cent respectively.
In November 2025, Nigeria raised another $2.35 billion through 10-year and 20-year Eurobonds.
Then came the much larger 2025–2026 external borrowing programme. President Tinubu requested parliamentary approval for approximately $21.5 billion, together with €2.19 billion, ¥15 billion and a €65 million grant, for infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, water, security, employment and other programmes. The National Assembly Senate approved the external borrowing plan in July 2025, alongside the yen facility and grant. The approved package also included up to $2 billion in foreign-currency-denominated domestic borrowing.
And in March 2026, the National Assembly also approved another request involving up to $5 billion from First Abu Dhabi Bank and $1 billion from UK Export Finance, principally for fiscal liquidity, budget implementation, refinancing and infrastructure including port projects. These, certainly, are not insignificant figures. They demonstrate why Nigerians are entitled to demand a comprehensive Tinubu Debt Ledger.
But one would want to ask: where has the money gone? Government says borrowed money is financing infrastructure, budget deficits, economic reforms, social intervention programmes, health, education, security, transport and refinancing of expensive obligations. In truth, some of these uses are legitimate. Borrowing to construct a railway, power plant, major road, irrigation system, port, industrial facility or other asset capable of generating economic returns can be justified. And borrowing to refinance an expensive short-term obligation with cheaper and longer-term financing can also be prudent. Borrowing to survive an extraordinary national emergency can be necessary and also borrowing to pay ordinary recurrent expenditure indefinitely is dangerous.
The greatest concern is therefore not simply how much Nigeria has borrowed, but what Nigerians received for the money. Nigerian
NewsLeader is particularly concerned about claims of money being “unaccounted for” or “disappearing.” Such allegations must not be converted into established facts without audit evidence. At present, there is insufficient credible evidence to declare that a particular multibillion-naira loan has simply “disappeared.” But that does not mean Nigerians should stop asking questions.
On the contrary, government should publish project-by-project details showing: the loan received; lender; interest rate; maturity; grace period; amount disbursed; implementing agency; contractor; project location; amount spent; amount outstanding; percentage completed; and measurable economic benefit. Anything less leaves room for suspicion.
Truthfully, the price of borrowing is generally heavy. Debt is not free money. The lender eventually wants the principal back and interest in the meantime. Nigeria's 2024 Eurobonds illustrate the danger. One tranche carries a coupon of 9.625 per cent and another 10.375 per cent. By 2026, President Tinubu himself was warning internationally about the enormous burden of debt service. He said Nigeria expected to spend approximately $11.6 billion on debt servicing in 2026, almost half of our nationally projected revenue. This is the real danger!
Every naira spent on servicing debt is a naira that cannot simultaneously build a hospital, equip a university, provide water, support agriculture or create jobs. The International Monetary Funds (IMF) has similarly warned that although Nigeria's debt ratio could decline under a successful reform scenario, interest costs are taking a high share of revenue and fiscal space for development and social spending remains insufficient.
Therefore, the argument that Nigeria's debt-to-GDP ratio remains below an internationally acceptable threshold is not enough. Nigeria's real problem is debt-service capacity. A poor country with weak revenue cannot safely borrow like a rich country simply because its debt-to-GDP ratio looks moderate.
Another critical question to ask, however, is: were these borrowings necessary? Nigeria could not reasonably have ignored COVID-19, recession, collapsing revenue, infrastructure deficiencies or national security challenges.
But necessity does not provide a blank cheque. The deeper failure of both the Buhari and Tinubu administrations has been the country's inability to match expenditure with sustainable revenue. Nigeria remains excessively dependent on oil and vulnerable to fluctuations in oil production and prices. The country has enormous tax potential, but a relatively narrow formal tax base.
Government expenditure is also burdened by leakages, inefficient agencies, duplicated programmes and expensive administration.
The answer cannot forever be that “There is a deficit. So, borrow.” That is not economic management. It is postponement of the day!
It is important to state here that countries that instinctively borrowed heavily like Nigeria, indeed, walked the land mines. Nigeria should study the experience of countries like Ghana, Zambia and Sri Lanka that travelled too far down this road. Ghana is perhaps the closest African warning. After accumulating severe fiscal and debt vulnerabilities, Ghana defaulted on much of its external debt in December 2022 and entered an IMF-supported restructuring process. The IMF subsequently classified Ghana's public debt as being in distress and unsustainable pending completion of restructuring.
Zambia also defaulted and spent years negotiating restructuring with creditors. Its experience demonstrated how difficult it can be to coordinate creditors when governments owe money to commercial lenders, China, Western institutions and bondholders simultaneously.
Sri Lanka provides an even more dramatic warning. After years of economic mismanagement and heavy borrowing, it defaulted on foreign debt in 2022 and required an IMF programme and a restructuring of more than $12 billion of debt.
Nigeria, though, is not Ghana, Zambia or Sri Lanka. But nations do not become insolvent overnight. Debt crises are usually built gradually, loan after loan, deficit after deficit, until revenue can no longer support repayment.
Therefore, suggested options in the view of economic experts, is that President Tinubu must declare a borrowing ceiling below the legal maximum and make additional borrowing exceptional rather than routine. Not only that, his government must borrow principally for projects capable of generating economic returns, not for routine consumption. And Nigeria must aggressively increase non-oil revenue without destroying businesses through excessive taxation.
Government must also cut waste. There is little moral justification for borrowing billions of dollars while maintaining expensive government structures, duplicated agencies, extravagant official expenditure and projects of questionable economic value.
Another option for the Tinubu government is to ensure that every loan should undergo a transparent cost-benefit analysis before approval. Every loan should have a public repayment schedule. And Nigeria should favour concessional multilateral financing where appropriate and avoid unnecessarily expensive commercial borrowing. It must develop public-private partnerships that bring private capital into commercially viable infrastructure instead of placing every burden on the sovereign balance sheet. The
government also should deepen domestic production. A country that imports what it can produce will continually borrow foreign exchange. And more importantly, the country must create a national debt dashboard accessible to every citizen.
But the biggest impediment to this accountability quest by the Nigerian people has been the National Assembly lawmakers who publicly and unabashedly portrayed itself as a rubber stamp parliament. Agreed, the federal legislature, in strict observance of the power separation principles, do not necessarily have to be combative and pig-headed to such executive borrowing plan. But they have a constitutional responsibility to thoroughly and with a legislative fine tooth comb, scrutinize the borrowing request. Loan
approvals should never be treated as a mere political formality.
And before approving another loan, lawmakers should demand:
the exact amount; the lender; interest rate;
fees and commissions; grace period; maturity date; collateral; repayment source;
project cost; implementation timetable; the contractor; expected economic return; and evidence of how previous loans were spent.
Most importantly, no new major borrowing should be approved until government accounts for the utilisation of earlier loans.
Beyond this Parliamentary interrogation, the media and the people have roles to play in holding the government accountable to the reason for loans, what should be borrowed within the country's limit and payment capability and how the borrowed funds must be utilised for it's designated specific purposes.
In this circumstance, the media, in particular, must stop reporting loan announcements as though they are development achievements.
A loan is not development but only a promise to repay. The development comes from what the borrowed money produces. Nigerian journalists should therefore follow every major loan from the day it is announced until the last naira is spent and the project completed. Civil society organisations (CSOs), professional bodies, economists, labour unions, religious organisations and ordinary citizens should equally demand accountability from government.
OUR POSITION ON FG's BORROWING HABIT
This newspaper, the Nigerian NewsLeader, believes that Nigeria cannot borrow its way out of underdevelopment. The country may borrow when borrowing is absolutely necessary, affordable and economically productive. But the era of borrowing simply because government revenue is inadequate must henceforth end. The former Buhari administration cannot be blamed for every naira of today's debt. It inherited problems and faced genuine economic shocks. But it left behind a dramatically larger debt burden.
The Tinubu administration equally inherited a difficult fiscal position and has undertaken major reforms that have changed the structure of government finances. But those reforms cannot become a justification for another cycle of uncontrolled borrowing. The current Asiwaju Tinubu administration must now demonstrate that every borrowed dollar and naira is working. The President should therefore place debt reduction and debt transparency at the centre of the remainder of his administration.
Nigeria does not merely need more revenue.
It needs better government and not merely need more loans. The government needs productive investment and not bigger budgets. It surely needs value for money and not another generation of leaders who spend today's money and send tomorrow's children the bill. Nigeria's debt has already become too large to be treated as an ordinary accounting statistic. The nation is borrowing its future. The question is whether it is borrowing to build that future or merely borrowing to survive the present. That question must now be answered, clearly, transparently and accountably.
The most important factual qualification is that ₦166.79 trillion is Nigeria's total public-debt stock, not the amount President Tinubu has personally borrowed since May 2023. The stock includes federal, state and FCT obligations and is affected by exchange-rate revaluation and the formal recognition/securitisation of older liabilities. The government's own July 2026 explanation says more than ₦40 trillion of the increase came from FX revaluation and about ₦33 trillion from securitised Ways and Means obligations. For now, Nigeria is jogging in the jungle! NNL.
